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The French philosopher Michel Foucault is
best known among academics as a theorizer
of human nature and social relationships.
Although his areas of expertise did not
encompass politics, which he attempted
to avoid altogether in his writings, many
of his philosophical ideas have been reexamined inside a political context. One of
his major theories, the idea of free speech
known as parrhesia, has made its way to the
foreground of scrutiny by political theorists
as well as an internationally-acclaimed
expert in rhetoric and professor by the name
Laurent Pernot. Since Michel Foucault’s
original historical analysis of parrhesia, or
frankly-spoken truth, on which he lectured
at the University of California at Berkeley in
1983, the subject of parrhesia in society has
continued to be an ongoing topic of interest
for philosophers and social scientists alike.
While Foucault was not so interested in the
implications of parrhesia in contemporary
politics and preferred to focus on the
ethical aspect of parrhesia instead (Pernot
2016), his discourse and implications have
nevertheless supplied political scientists with
a vast concept to explore. Despite the fact
that he dismissed rhetoric as incompatible
with parrhesia based on the form of speech
(Foucault 1983), Foucault never addresses
certain inconsistencies with this claim (Pernot
2016). Nevertheless, Laurent Pernot’s
argument for compatibility between rhetoric
and parrhesia in the political arena does
take into account Foucault’s requirements
for parrhesia, and further evidence for a
relationship between parrhesia and rhetoric
can be determined through Foucault’s own
research on modernity.
Foucault’s concept of parrhesia defines a
practice of truth-telling that necessitates
certain circumstances. To meet the
requirements of parrhesia, one must speak
the truth frankly, risk oneself in some

substantial manner by speaking this truth, use
this truth to criticize the audience, and feel a
sense of duty to speak this criticism (Foucault
1983). The risk that goes along with parrhesia
typically includes risk of life, punishment, or
significant loss of social standing. Because of
this, the truth-teller must be subordinate to
the audience. However, the one speaking with
parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, also must be free
to speak the truth freely of his own accord;
meaning that he must also not be a slave or
non-citizen, in the case of ancient Greece
(Foucault 1983).
It is this attribute of frankness which causes
Foucault to determine that rhetoric is
incompatible with parrhesia (Foucault 1983). In
his lectures, Foucault refers to rhetoric as that
form of speech where the speaker uses vague
terms and oblique explanations to convince his
audience of his point, whether it is a truthful
point or not; in contrast, he paints parrhesia
as being the more direct and concise form of
speech to convey what the speaker truthfully
believes (1983). Similarly, Foucault rejects the
concept of parrhesia in rhetoric because of the
dialect used; he says, “The continuous long
speech is a rhetorical or sophistical device,
whereas the dialogue through questions and
answers is typical for parrhesia” (1983). In
short, he determines that rhetoric is only to be
applied in long, vague speeches, and parrhesia
requires that the language be direct and the
speech be in a conversational format.

“Foucault’s main focus, is
actually a newer form of
political parrhesia in which a
citizen speaks truthfully to his
superior or ruler in order to
critique policies.”
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Laurent Pernot, in his lecture on rhetoric and
parrhesia, argues that rhetoric and parrhesia
are very compatible (2016). Referencing
Foucault’s preference to historical analysis,
Pernot argues that Foucault neglected
a branch of parrhesia, which he refers to
as political parrhesia (2016). In his lecture
in 2016, Pernot asserted that political
parrhesia, which is the equivalent of rhetoric,
is actually the root of ethical parrhesia, which
is the form of parrhesia of which Foucault
spoke: the aforementioned direct truthtelling in dialectic format. Rhetoric, according
to Pernot, is the original political speech; it
could be seen historically when a citizen of
Athens would give a speech to the senate
(2016). Pernot asserts that ethical parrhesia,
Foucault’s main focus, is actually a newer
form of political parrhesia in which a citizen
speaks truthfully to his superior or ruler in
order to critique policies (2016). Instead of
speaking generally to a congregation, the
speaker is specifically directing his speech
at the ruler (2016). Despite the fact that
the political parrhesiastes is not directing
his critique specifically at the overall ruler,
Pernot insists that there is still some level of
risk to the speaker; his reputation could be
ruined, he could be exiled for corruption, or
he could lose his rights to speak (2016). In
this case, the speaker is not challenging the
ruler, but instead the ruling majority (2016).
Similarly, the political parrhesiastes,
or rhetorician, may meet the other
requirements of parrhesia (2016). Although
they may speak in long lectures, they may
speak frankly therein (2016). Although they
may speak vaguely and guide the audience
toward their own conclusions, they may do
so in a dialectic format (2016). Socrates, for
example, is a good example of this; although
he conversed with his arguers in such a way
to debate the topic, he was also very wellknown for not giving any direct
answers (2016).

The link between Foucault’s parrhesia
and Pernot’s rhetoric may be more easily
understood if one takes into account Foucault’s
interpretation of enlightenment and modernity.
Foucault describes the Enlightenment as “the
age of the critique,” (1984, 38), referencing
the philosopher Immanuel Kant to show how
enlightenment is the application of reason and
logic to determine the best circumstances in
a situation (1984, 37). Foucault then describes
modernity as relating to enlightenment as an
attitude toward the contemporary instead of an
overall ideal (1984, 39). In this way, modernity
is an attitude that takes into account the
current state of affairs both political and ethical;
instead of simply being a way to perceive
the present, however, it is a way to operate
within the present in order to improve existing
circumstances inside the confines of the current
situation (Foucault 1984, 40-41).
Keeping this concept of modernity in mind,
it becomes easier to see how rhetoric may
relate to parrhesia. The relationship would be
similar to that of enlightenment and modernity;
whereas ethical parrhesia is the frank truthtelling of present circumstances to a ruler,
rhetoric is that parrhesia which requires
a gentler nudge in the direction of truth
according to the constraints of the situation
at that time. Considering Socrates once more,
his debates with others often resulted in the
opposing arguer realizing that he no longer
believed or understood what he previously
thought was certain. If Socrates at this time
had simply told his arguers what was wrong
with their reasoning, they would not have
been convinced of these truths; they would
have called him mad, ignored him altogether,
or simply had him indicted of corruption much
earlier in life because of such controversial
beliefs. Instead, Socrates used a rhetorical line
of questioning to gently lead his arguers into
their own conclusions so that they applied their
own reasoning to discern the truth. In this way,
Socrates had an attitude of modernity which
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required him to use political parrhesia over
ethical parrhesia in order to obtain the
desired results.
These same concepts may be applied to
politicians today. Although politicians in the
United States are viewed in a very negative
manner, and many of them use rhetoric to
convince the audience of what they want
instead of what they actually believe as
Foucault says, those politicians that are
truth-tellers must still use rhetoric in order
to lead the audience down the correct
path of reasoning. While these politicians
may currently be in a position of political
power, it is important to note that they still
risk their careers in truth-telling even now,
particularly in democratic nations such as
the United States where the voters hold the
power to elect or reprimand their political
representatives. To speak truthfully to their
constituents can be risky for remaining in
office or future elections, even when using
that gentler form of political parrhesia
instead of the blunt honesty of ethical
parrhesia.
At this point it is paramount to distinguish
between rhetoric as political parrhesia
and the rhetoric used to incite a certain
feeling in an audience without reasoning
or logic to support it, which has become
ever more present in modern politics.
Political parrhesia still presupposes a line
of clear reasoning supported by evidence
and logic, while the former rhetoric only
aims to convince the audience based on
emotional response, such as fear or pride.
A politician that utilizes political parrhesia
would guide his or her constituents to the
truth by means of observable evidence and
reasoning, not simply subjective opinions
or baseless claims. While active politicians
may utilize both of these forms of rhetoric,
it is only political parrhesia that is related

to modernity and therefore ethical parrhesia.
Being able to distinguish between these two
forms of rhetoric in practice is a more difficult
task, and frequently the way a politician is
perceived in this regard is what may tip favor
toward or against him or her.
Although Foucault’s limited views of parrhesia
caused him to miss entirely the concept of
rhetoric in parrhesia, it is Foucault’s work
on modernity and parrhesia that enables
the determination of relationship between
political parrhesia and ethical parrhesia.
Through his study of parrhesia, Foucault
built the groundwork for Pernot’s research
into rhetoric and the two distinct forms of
parrhesia, enabling him to ascertain the link
between rhetoric and political parrhesia. It is
through Foucault’s studies on enlightenment
and modernity that one can then discern the
link between ethical parrhesia and political
parrhesia that Foucault missed on his own.
This was surely largely in part due to his
quick dismissal of rhetoric in his early studies.
Nevertheless, this relationship between
parrhesia and rhetoric is clear to see once
one locates the essential points, and then
it can be utilized to more easily understand
how truthful speech between politicians and
their constituents is conveyed today.
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